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ABSTRACT. This paper is a review of some experimental results suggesting a way for modeling 
social interactions.  We focus on two classical games, the ultimatum and the dictator game. 
Using observed facts in laboratory, we ask whether individual rationality could be explained 
by the presence of a norm of behavior. Norms suggest to individuals what is the appropriate 
behaviour in  social interactions. They serve as a  reference point  for triggering  sanctions by 
other players or emotional feelings for deviants.  Actions are judged according to a norm and 
norms are themselves context dependent (actions available, framing effects, culture, 
decisional context). Norms emerge. Belief about the right « norm » depends on everyday 
observations. Behaviour is shaped by norms and norms by behaviour leading to complexity 
especially when interaction are localized.   
RESUME.  Nous passons en revue des résultats sur les jeux de l’ultimatum et du dictateur pour 
appréhender la modélisation des interactions sociales. On montre que le choix des actions 
des individus ne se fait pas seulement par rapport à la distribution des conséquences  
(présence ou non de préférences sociales) mais que cette distribution est souvent jugée par 
rapport à des critères normatifs dépendants du contexte (ce qu’il est normal de faire dans une 
situation pour une population donnée). La présence ou non d’alternatives de choix 
compatibles avec la norme affectera le jugement  porté par les individus sur une distribution 
particulière de conséquences. De plus, les croyances quant aux comportements appropriés 
conditionnent les comportements eux-mêmes et entraînent l’apparition de normes qui peuvent 
évoluer en fonction du contexte par un phénomène d’apprentissage de la nouvelle norme.    
KEY WORDS: norms , rationality, complexity, Ultimatum and Dictator game. 
MOTS-CLÉS: normes , rationalité, complexité, jeux de l’Ultimatum et du Dictateur. 
 
 
 
  
1 Introduction 
There is a non trivial link between norms and individual behaviour. From the 
individual point of view, norms prescribe how individuals should behave in a given 
circumstance. They shape beliefs by suggesting the appropriate behaviour in a social 
context and by setting the  frame in which actions are judged.. Olstrom [2000] states 
that “a norm,…, is the propensity to feel shame and to anticipate sanctions by others 
at the thought of behaving in a certain , forbidden way…”. From an individualism 
methodology point of view, one can say that norms are emerging from the actions of 
interacting individuals (Boudon [1998], Opp [2001]).  Since behaviour is shaped by 
norms and norms by behaviour there is a non trivial retroaction leading to 
complexity.  We will review some experimental results which will suggest how the 
usual utilitarian framework is affected by norms. We focus on two classical games, 
the ultimatum game (UG in the following) and dictator game (DG) which have 
received much attention in the past two decades. By surveying observed facts in the 
laboratory, we discuss the alternative hypotheses concerning individual preference 
modeling and the formation of expectations with respect to norms.  
There is compelling evidence that individuals adhere to cooperative norms 
(empirically or factually observed) both in repeated and non repeated interactions. In 
public good games or prisoner dilemma, where individual and collective interests 
are in conflict, people cooperate although “rational” behaviour would suggest them 
to deviate (Leydyard [1995]). Since Adam Smith, economic theory has considered 
that self-interest in the driving factor of homo-eoconomicus. The selfishness 
approach may explain cooperation by the repetition of the game (Axelrod and 
Hamilton [1981], Fudenberg and Maskin [1986] , Kreps et al. [1982]. In that case, 
cooperation is grounded on the concept of reciprocal altruism (Trivers [1971]): 
cooperation in bilateral interactions occurs only for the gain of future reciprocation. 
However self-regarding behaviour does not explain cooperation involving 
anonymous interactions in one shot games and experimental studies have shown that 
considering self-interest alone is not enough for explaining behaviour observed in 
the laboratory1. Two types of theories have been put forward to explain 
experimental data. Social preference models (Fehr et Schmitt [1999], Bolton et 
Ockenfels [2000]) posit that individuals are not only interested in their own gains 
but also by the distribution of gains among individuals.  Reciprocal models (Rabin 
[1993], Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger [1999], Falk and Fischbacher [2000], 
Charness and Rabin [2002] Bowles and Gintis [2003])  posit that the gains of others 
enter positively or negatively in the individual preference function depending on 
whether “others” are considered as being nice or mean to the player. Models based 
on reciprocity involve a concept of equilibrium based on psychological games 
(Geanakoplos et al. [1989]). Utility of a player is now a combination of the 
monetary outcome of the play plus a reward or punishment function depending on 
                             
1 The list would be to long but some examples are Camerer and Thaler [1995], Dawes and Thaler [1988], 
Camerer [2003], Fischbacher U. et al.  [2001],  Fehr and Gächter [2000], [2004],  Fehr and Fischbacher 
[2004], Ledyard [1995]. 
intentions in the strategic play. Since intentions require beliefs of higher order 
(beliefs of the player on what others will play, belief about what others think the 
player will play, etc…), the cognitive capacity required concerning coherence of 
beliefs of different levels gives to norms a crucial role. They reduce the cognitive 
overload needed to “compute” the best action and enable individuals to correlate 
their actions on a common belief.  In some sense, a norm becomes  a shared belief 
on how to play. However, the concept requires that the adequate normative 
behaviour must be evident for at least some players, actions must be observed, and  
at least some people must be willing to punish deviants from the desired norm so 
that it becomes  popular or self-sustained. Otherwise, actions may converge to an 
undesired norm (full defection in public good games for example).   
In section 2, we present the experimental results of the Ultimatum game.  In 
section 3, we consider whether the proposed split relates to a concern for fairness or 
merely to a strategic behavior. The dictator game allows us to discriminate 
(imperfectly) between both assumptions and show us that social distance and some 
reciprocal preferences driven by expectation exist. In section 4, we consider the 
responders’ rejection strategy and show that a lot can be explained by negative 
reciprocity although negative reciprocity is framed by norms. Notably causal 
attribution and contextual factors affect the rejection rate. In section 5,  we conclude.   
2 Experimental results and preference modeling 
Individual rationality is explored in a game theoretical context by the use of an 
UG. Suppose that two individuals must share a pie of S =100 ECU in a one shot 
interaction. In all the following games, players play for real money (ECU are 
transformed into real money according to an exchange rate known to all 
individuals). Individual 1 (called the proposer in the following) offers a split (S-x, x) 
to the second player (called the responder) who may  accept or refuse it. If the 
responder refuses they  both end up with (0,0).  Any split of (S-x, x) can be 
supported as an equilibrium given a proposer’s belief about the responder’s  
rejection rate. However, the subgame perfect equilibrium would predict (99, 1) as a 
rational outcome. The argument goes as follow: the responder would accept any 
positive offer if he has a preference structure characterized by an increasing utility 
function for money. Under the assumption that the proposer knows  that the 
responder is rational and selfish, a selfish proposer offers the lowest positive unit of 
money in play to the responder.2  Many experimental results show the following  
(Camerer [2003]): the mode and median of the distribution are generally around 40-
50 % of the initial pie and the mean offer around 30 %.  Only a few offers are in low 
categories  0%, 1-10 % or the hyper fair category 51-100 % . Offers between  40-50 
% are seldom rejected but offers under approximately 20 % or so of the initial stake  
                             
2 (100, 0) is another subgame perfect equilibrium where the responder accepts 0. However such an 
equilibrium prediction seems  even less robust.  
are rejected half of the time. These results are robust to the stake and notably the 
subgame perfect equilibrium is not the outcome (Cameron [1999], Slonim and Roth 
[1998]).  How can we explain this divergence from theory? Since for one shot games, no 
incentive for intertemporal utility maximization exists, one assumption is that these 
offers reflect proposers’ fairness consideration. Another assumption is that offers are 
strategic and maximize some utility of money given some beliefs about the 
responders’ rejections rate. A DG (dictator game) discriminates between both 
assumptions since in this case the responder has no other choice but to accept the 
offer. In a DG selfish proposers should give zero. By contrast,  any positive offer 
reflects a true concern for comparative payoffs and should be a measure expressing 
preferences for fairness. To present more formally the approach, consider the 
following simplification of UG where the  proposer has only three actions. Either a 
split of a = (80,20) or b = (50,50) or c = (20,80).  Multi-criteria decision analysis 
postulates that an individual has a set of actions A= {a, b, c} and a set of dimension 
N={1,2,..n} along which the agent evaluates each action. Moreover, for each 
dimension {1,..., }j n∈ , the individual has a preference relation • j over his set of 
actions in A defining a preference profile  p = (• 1, …,• n). The problem for the agent 
consists in finding a global preference function • defined on the profile p.  The 
dimensions reflect different objectives of the agent. If  an agent maximizes only its 
own wealth then game theory traditionally  assumes the existence of a Von 
Neumann and Morgenstern (VNM) utility function and the following normal form 
game is being played : 
 
                 Responder 
        A                           R 
 
Proposer 
 
 
a 
b 
c 
u1(80),u2(20)          u1(0),u2(0)  
u1(50),u2(50)          u1(0),u2(0) 
u1(20),u2(80)          u1(0),u2(0) 
 
Definition: an egoist or self-interested individual is an agent that has a 
preference relation defined over its own outcome or function of its own outcomes .   
The agent may also have some distributional preference over outcomes. In that 
case some authors have assumed that agents have a preference profile defined by 
two criteria p =  (• 1, •2) the first criteria being his absolute gain and the second 
criteria a concern for social preferences including the other player’s gain. For 
example, if player 1 is inequity averse then the absolute value of the difference 
between the profit of player 1 and 2 enters negatively in the utility function of player 
1 (Fehr and Schmidt [1999]).  More generally, the matrix  becomes:  
                         Responder 
 
 
 
 
Responders who reject positive amounts of money are irrational if they are only 
money maximizers.  However, rejections may be explained by social preferences 
such as a preference for fairness.  Strong reciprocity is another explanation that has 
been put forward in the literature ( Gintis et al [2003], Gintis and Bowles [2001]):    
Definition: Strong reciprocity is the propensity of an individual to sacrifice 
resources to be kind toward those who are being kind or  to sacrifice resources to 
punish those who are being unkind.  
Negative (strong) reciprocity is a motivation to adopt an action that harms 
someone else, at one’s own material cost, because that person’s intentional 
behaviour was perceived to be harmful to oneself. Perception, norms and context 
may thus determine what is considered as being kind or unkind. In that case, the 
general utilitarian model ui(x,1-x) is not sufficient and the function ui(x,1-x) should 
be context dependant. Notably the matrix of utility may change in different 
normative contexts. We show some experimental evidence on this. Ideally, we 
would like to shape the importance of the notion of norm in the definition of 
individual beliefs and preferences modeling.  
3 Fairness or strategic offer?  
3.1 Some results for the UG game 
Are individuals egoistic maximizers or altruistic beings? Roth et al. [1991] 
compared UG played  in 4 developed countries (US, Japan, Yugoslavia and Israel) 
over 10 rounds in a stranger design.  Modal offers were all at 50% of the pie in all 4 
countries in the first round of play.  Given the rejection rate for all data over 10 
periods, the modal offer in the last period (round 10) corresponds to the offer 
maximising expected outcome. There is some rationality in the proposer’s offer3. 
Countries’ discrepancy in offers increased over periods except for Yugoslavia and 
United states which had no significant differences in offers in the first and last 
                             
3 A stranger design insures that two players will meet only once in the repeated game. A stranger design 
should be equivalent to a one shot game since there is no incentive for an individual to build up a 
reputation. However, Abink et  al. [2004] show that a group rationality exists. Some players reject more 
often when being able to build up a group reputation of being “tough” which in turn provides higher gains 
to responders in later periods. Indirect reciprocity (Alexander, [1987]) exists. Roth et al. [1991] did not 
control for this effect.  This should reinforce the number of offers near 50%.  
                A                                   R 
 
Proposer 
a 
b 
c 
   u1(80,20), u2(80,20)        u1(0,0),  u2(0,0) 
   u1(50,50), u2(50,50)        u1(0,0), u2(0,0) 
   u1(20,80), u2(80,20)        u1(0,0), u2(0,0) 
periods (mode at 50%) and remained the countries with highest offers (the mode of 
Israel was at 40% and Japan at 40 and 45%). A striking fact is that the distribution of 
offers in the first period are quite similar across countries (Israel and Japan being a 
bit more self-interested) revealing thereby some nearby distribution of beliefs (at the 
population level) about what should be an adequate offer. In addition, offers are far 
away from the subgame perfect equilibrium (figure 1) showing that proposers did 
not expect that responders were only selfish.   
Figure 1: offers in 4 developped countries (1st round) 
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Moreover,  rejections rates adapted over periods. Winter et Zamir [1997] showed 
a similar effect by considering an UG where real players played against a mix of 
virtual players (computer programs) and real players.  They showed that real players 
adapt their beliefs and strategies to their environment: proposers learn to lower their 
offers in tough environments whereas responders learn to accept low offers in 
presence of tough proposers. As stated by Kahneman, Knetsch et Thaler [1986]: 
« Terms of exchange that are initially seen unfair may in time  acquire the status of a 
reference transaction ».  These first results seem to suggest that if some norm of 
fairness exists it is  for strategic reasons (also Kagel et al.  [1996]). Nevertheless, no 
country seems to be as egoistic as suggested by game theory. But  high offers are 
merely a response to some belief about rejection rates and at best, only some 
individuals have fair preferences4. In other terms, most individuals are selfish but 
they know that an acceptable offer can only be around the fairness point.  Henrich 
found probably was the most self-interested culture. The Machiguenga trib average 
offer was at 0.26 with a mode at 0.15 /0.25 (72%) and there was only 1 rejection 
(over 10).  In a subsequent study, Henrich et al. [2003] showed that the ultimatum 
(UG) or public good (PG) games are played quite differently in 15 different tribs 
located in different part of the world. Mean offers vary between 26% to 58% 
(compared to 43-48% for games with students) and modal offers vary between 15% 
and 50% (students 50%). The tribs rank from society where the rejection in the UG 
                             
4 Children are generally more self-interested than adult suggesting that what is considered as an 
acceptable offer evolves with age (Murnighan et Saxon [1998], Harbaugh et al. [2000]). 
is very rare although offers from the proposer are very low. In other groups, 
rejection rates are substantial although offers are fair (status seeking competition). 
Except for two groups (Hadza and Sangu farmers), offers are generally different 
from a maximizing behaviour of proposers (even by integrating risk aversion) given 
responders’ rejection rate. In order to explain data, other factors such as social 
preferences  or “norms of playing the game” have to be considered. The authors 
show that a large part of the observed variability at the group level is explained by 
two factors: market integration and gains from cooperation. Market integration is 
highly correlated to the complexity structure of the group organization (family level 
of society through chiefdoms) which might constitute an explanation. The fair norm 
is more probable in groups with a high degree of market integration and large gains 
from cooperation.  At the individual level, there are two possible interpretations of 
the result: either individuals maximize some generalized preference function over 
the distribution of outcomes. Or individuals have relative stable beliefs (perhaps 
more or less dispersed within the group) on the way they should act. These beliefs 
are inherited by every day  life situations (for example hunter groups of large 
catches are more used to share the pie in a fair way).  Thereby deviations from 
prescribed actions in these rule abiding groups, are more likely to trigger sanctions 
by others, reinforcing the respect for the rule. On the other hand, groups with 
relatively disconnected  members are probably less constrained by norm abiding 
rules. In such groups, behaviour could be more dispersed (no true norm) or more self 
interested (an egoistic norm).  For example, Machiguenga and Tsimane tribs live in 
societies with little cooperation, exchange or sharing beyond the family unit. There 
is little fear of social sanctions and little care about the public opinion.  
Machiguenga had the lowest offers with only one rejection and Tsimane had no 
rejection (mean offer at 0.37).  
3.2 Comparing Ultimatum games and Dictator Games 
If responders are constrained to accept proposers’ offers, strategic offers 
disappear. Forsythe et al. [1994] observed that contributions are lower in the DG 
than in the UG. In DG, 35% of offers were below 10% of the endowment  whereas 
none was observed in the UG. Approximately 20% of individuals offered 41% or 
more compared to more than 60% in UG. Mean offers were at approximately 23% 
compared to 44% for UG. Thus a portion of offers in UG are strategic but not all 
individuals are purely self-interested, expressing apparently a concern for fairness. 
However, several results show than when social distance between players increases 
the mean contribution decreases (Bohnet and  Frey  [1999], Hoffman et al.  
[1994,1996], Haley K.J and Fessler [2005].  The  fear of being observed and judged 
by pears seems to be an important concern for individuals and triggers expectations 
about normative behaviour.  In turn, it suggests that pro-social behaviour in the DG 
may be an expression of reciprocity driven by expectations about what is an 
appropriate gift by the dictator.  Pro-social behaviour are supported by emotions 
(Bowles and Gintis [2003]). Emotions are triggered whenever an individual feels 
that he is acting meanly according to a certain intrinsic  norm of behaviour. 
However behaviour must be observed. Thus in the case of the dictator such feelings 
is more or less activated by social distance or observable behaviour although the 
proposer has no reason to fear any monetary sanction. Some authors (Gneezy and 
Rustichini [2000], Barr [2001]) have suggested that social disapproval may work 
more effectively than monetary sanctions which are often seen by individuals as a 
price to be paid for not respecting the norm (Gneezy and Rustichini [2000]). Dana et 
al. [2006] showed that when an exit option is offered to proposers (they can leave 
the game without sharing the pie and get 9$ out of a pie 10$ leaving nothing to the 
receiver) then a significant proportion of agent prefer to take the exit option rather 
than sharing even if this implies a suboptimal allocation ((9,1) is better than (9,0)). 
These exit choices are clearly related to the fact that the dictator wants to avoid the 
judgement of the receiver (even for an anonymous game). When a new game is 
played where the dictator is insured that the origin of the gift will be hidden (i.e. the 
receiver will just be told that he gets an additional sum without knowing that it was 
left by the proposer) then the exit choice is no more used (except for 1 decision over 
24). If actions are judged with respect to norms, beliefs about the appropriate norm 
will although depend on the context in which actions are taken. Chery et al. [2002] 
show that depending on the effort made by the proposers to win their income, the 
split will be different. In a double blind treatment with effort, contributions fall to 
zero in the DG.  The context affects thus the social preference of individuals and 
they may become completely selfish under certain conditions.  A way of modelling 
the agents’ preferences is to introduce a third attribute into the preference function 
of a player which is an expression of emotions like guilt, shame , empathy (Bowles 
and Gintis [2003], Gordon et al. [2005] , Phan and Waldeck [2008]). However such 
a component may be cultural, context and even individual specific. Moreover the 
activation of such a component will depend on the feeling (beliefs) about the 
appropriate norm.  
4 Rationality on the rejection?  
Why do individuals reject a substantial amount of money in UG? Two possible 
explanations are inequity aversion (Fehr et Schmitt (1999], Bolton et Ockenfels 
[2000]) or negative reciprocity (Falk and Fischbacher [2000]). Falk et Fischbacher 
propose an UG that discriminates between the two hypotheses. They looked at the 
responders’ rejection rates when the proposer plays strategy U depending on an 
outcome if the proposer would have played D (figure 2).  Outcomes are represented 
by a couple of numbers where the first number represents the outcome to the 
proposer and the second to the responder. They proposed  4 treatments by varying 
the possible outcome for the path D (for proposer) followed by A (for responder). 
The four treatments were:  (.,.) = {(5,5), (2,8), (8,2), (10,0)}. If the responder is only 
concerned by the distribution of consequences, the rejection rate if U is chosen,  
should not depend on what happens if he chooses D. Indeed, Falk and Fischbacher 
 
showed that rejection rates (RR) when U depends on the outcome for the path (D,A) 
that is: RR(5,5) > RR(2,8) > RR(8,2) > RR(10,0). Since RR (10,0) > 0 some 
rejections may also be explained by fairness.    
  
 
Responders may have two concerns when rejecting an offer. Either their beliefs 
about a norm of fairness are not met engendering disappointment. Or they may feel 
that the proposer’s intention was mean. In the first case, rejection is independent on 
the origin of the offer.  Blount (1995) shows that individuals have a need to infer 
causes and to assign responsibilities for why outcomes occur5.  In a first study, she 
looked at the importance of causal attribution in the rejection of the responder. Three 
attribution processes were considered: Nature, a non interested Third Party 
Condition (3rd PC)  and a self Interested proposer Condition (IC) 6. Responders were 
asked to fix their Minimum Acceptable Offer  (MAO) which was the lowest amount 
under which the offer was rejected. If Nature is the origin of the attribution then  the 
observed MAO are near the subgame perfect equilibrium. There was no significant 
difference in MAOs between the 3rd PC and the IC. One possible explanation is first 
in the responders’ expectations: in the 3rd PC, responders expect a symmetric 
distribution of offers with a peak at 50% whereas the expected distribution is right 
skewed for the IC. MAO may thus be strategically lower in the IC.  A second 
explanation is in the importance of relative payoff comparison for the responder: in 
the 3rd PC, responders are less concerned by comparative payoffs (because there is 
no intention involved in the split). This effect should induce lower MAOs in the 3rd 
PC than in the IC. Indeed, this latter involves intentions and  a greater responder’s 
willingness to compare payoffs and to reject low offers. Observations show that the 
two effects compensate. An additional explanation of high MAOs in the 3rd PC is the 
breaking of the expected fairness norm.  Blount advanced then the hypothese that if 
the stress is put on the impact of responders’ rejection on the passive player 1 (not 
                             
5 See also Kagel et al. [1996] for similar results on the impact of intentions and norm breaking on 
rejections. 
6 In the 3rd PC, the offer was made by an non-interested third party whereas rejection affected a passive 
player 1 (in the role of proposer of the UG) different  from the 3rd party.  
  
  
   
   
 
  
  
  
Figure 2 
responsible for the split) in the 3rd PC, it should then reduce MAOs. In a 3rd study, 
she varied the procedure of the experiment. Instead of asking for a statement of 
MAO, responders were made clear by filling out a questionnaire (like the question 
below)  of the impact of rejections of the offer in the 3rd PC on an innocent player 1. 
In this 3rd study, the 3rd PC showed significantly lower MAO than the IC (with same 
procedure). It shows that stressing on the impact of receiver’s decision on an 
innocent player, may change the reference point of evaluation (whereas all other 
treatments i.e. MAO statements and interested party condition with questionnaire  
showed no difference). Blount and Bazerman [1996] found a similar effect of the 
elicitation procedure. They showed to subjects questions like : suppose that the 
other player proposes to take 6 dollars  and gives you 4 ; you accept the 4 dollars or 
reject and get zero?  The MAO reported in the condition asking for MAO was 4 (out 
of 10) while in the second condition it was 2.33 showing a framing effect of 
changing the reference point. By stating MAO, the reference point is the fair norm 
(for those “groups”), whereas answering the question, the reference point becomes 
zero.   
5 Conclusion 
The experiments presented suggest that individuals in a game are not only 
concerned by the distribution over outcomes (selfish or social utility) but that the 
concern of doing the right thing (i.e. meeting the expectation of others) is important. 
Actions are judged according to a norm and norms are themselves context dependent 
(actions available, framing effect, culture, decisional context). Norms emerge. Belief 
about the right « norm » of behaviour depends on everyday observations of 
individuals. An implication is that  individuals may have different feelings about the 
right norm especially in local interaction structure where information is localized.  
Expectations are evolving according to observations.  In the case where beliefs 
about the right norm are shared, each individual propensity to adopt the norm may 
depend on sanctions (real or moral) when not behaving as suggested by the norm 
and diminish the individual utility. Moral costs may by proportional to the number 
of adopters of the norm. The following example may highlight the process: 
everybody in a city may be convinced that the socially collective optimal behaviour 
is not to steal. If the norm is respected then an individual caught  when steeling may 
feel ashamed. But if every body else is steeling in the city the shame may disappear.  
Gordon et al. [2005] and Phan and Waldeck [2008] showed that polymorphic 
equilibria with cooperation may exist, depending on the distribution of moral cost. 
Convergence to this equilibrium depends on the number of initial cooperators . 
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